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 At the Duchess Theatre on the Charing Cross Road No Sex Please, We’re British, a 
bedroom farce, is, we are reliably informed, in its 16th. hysterical year.  The so-called 
‘Rationality Debate’ is at least one year older.  There are parallels between the two.[1]  Farce, 
contrary to appearances, usually depends on people behaving with impeccable logic.  
Unfortunately the concatenation of circumstances or misunderstandings leads to preposterous 
consequences.  Logic is not a good enough guide through the vicissitudes of life and human 
communication.  Both farce and the rationality debate are revivals of long traditions, which 
have become so anglicized that they have acquired a distinctly national, at times parochial, 
character.  In both the participants take themselves very seriously, are convinced they are 
behaving rationally and are puzzled why everyone else is so mistaken or even crazy.  
Literally or intellectually according to the genre, people tend to land up with the most 
unsuitable bed-partners and catch others with their trousers down.  With minor variations the 
plots seem similar: the stock characters, situations and confrontations have an air of dja vu.  
In matters of sex and rationality, stereotypes will out.  The British bluffly attribute 
moderation in both to themselves, excess in both to other Europeans (commonly to the 
French, sometimes to the Germans), and a surfeit of sexuality but a deficit of reason to the 
inhabitants of the former colonies.  What one does not like in oneself is displaced onto 
Others. 
 
 In spite of the insularity, the recent debate about rationality in Britain raises some broad 
and interesting issues.  The status of reason raises perennial epistemological questions, which 
are fought out on a wide range of fronts from the history and philosophy of science to 
decision-making in economics.  What has been distinctive in Britain is the particular way the 
argument has extended to anthropology.  For convenience, we may take this as starting with a 
paper by Winch ‘Understanding a primitive society’ (1964, but first brought to wider 
attention on being reprinted in Rationality in 1970) which reappraises Evans-Pritchard’s work 
on Azande witchcraft (1937).  Besides the plethora of articles, the debate is periodically 
punctuated by collections of essays which rehearse the issues, beginning with Rationality 
(1970) edited by Wilson; Rationality and relativism (1982) edited by Hollis and Lukes, a 
return to similar themes by several of the contributors.  While the first two are weighted in 
favour of philosophers and rationalists, a sustained critique of rationalism, mainly by 
anthropologists, appeared subsequently in Reason and morality (1985) edited by Overing.[2]  
Crudely, the issue is about whether human beliefs and actions are necessarily and sufficiently 
explained by universal criteria of reason or whether differences in culture and context are 
irreducible or incommensurable enough to vitiate such a sweeping claim.  There is no neat 
division between philosophers and anthropologists on the matter.  And, as no two participants 
see the issues at stake identically, no simple summary is possible.  What is fairly clear though 
is that the debate involves radically different views about the nature of knowledge or 
understanding of humans and, or in, society.  The breadth of what is involved is prodigious.  
Not only does it embrace questions of the relation of logic and practical reason to truth and 
reality, but also the universality of perception and its capacity to determine the parameters of 
thought, in other words human nature or mind.  To the extent that (any such) knowledge 
depends on language, a complete theory requires an account of meaning and translation, and 
also of the relationship between cultural belief and action.  Precious little is left out. 
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The Ghosts’ High Noon 
 
 Before turning to the detailed arguments of the rationality debate, it is instructive to note 
what is left out, especially by the proponents of rationality.  (The expression ‘Rationality 
Debate’ is itself something of a misnomer, as it is characterized by the rationalists’ 
determination to demonstrate that there is nothing to debate at all.  They wish, in the words of 
W. S. Gilbert, to ‘rule a National School’.  My use is therefore ironic.)  As this article is 
addressed to a Dutch readership, I would like to draw on attention to the incisive comments 
by the late Bob Scholte in his review of Rationality and relativism.[3]  Rationality is  
 
an issue that has preoccupied us since the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction...  The 
preoccupation with rationality actually dates from our disenchantment with myth as an 
explanatory model.  We would thus have to go back as far as Plato.  He first defined the 
nature of academic knowledge and abstract rationality – a definition wrought with 
anthropological implications. (1984: 960) 
 
Interestingly enough, two important contemporary links are not mentioned: one, the 
rationalism of Lévi-Strauss and the structuralist movement generally; and, two, the recent 
interest in rationality and anthropology exhibited by members of the so-called Frankfurter 
Schule. (1984: 961)  
 
The rationalist has resurrected familiar and questionable dichotomies between "us" and 
"them" - dichotomies, moreover, that are never innocently descriptive but quite judgemental 
and self-serving. (1984: 964)  
 
The case for rationalism is triply remarkable.  It pays scant attention to its own history, which 
threatens to vitiate the facile vision of the inexorable and self-evident emergence of reason as 
neutrally reported by rationalists themselves.  It also ignores the long history of argument 
about the nature and limits of reason in the two intellectual traditions, which have arguably 
contributed the most to refinements of the notion.  Lastly it rests upon extraordinarily slender 
ethnographic sources.[4]  Rarely has so much been written by so many on so little evidence.  
It is a matter of concern that, some forty years into the post-colonial era, the thinking and 
practice of most of the world remain beneath serious consideration.  The days of the 
Intellectual Raj are, it seems, not over. 
 
 The rationality debate is then distinguished by the exclusions it makes.  In this section 
therefore I consider some of the past ghosts, which haunt the debate.  I then review the 
central arguments in the light of some of the contemporary work, which has been excluded.  
Finally I outline the replies to rationalist claims by the contributors to Reason and morality 
(1985) who question the hegemony of reason and try to explore the implications of the 
increasingly rich ethnographic sources for an understanding of the place of reason in culture. 
 
 The history of argument about the role of reason in understanding the nature of the world 
is conventionally traced back to classical Greece.  Not only was the regularity of nature 
(phusis) supposed to be amenable to a true, analytical account, logos, but the cosmos itself 
was organized according to logos.  
 
The Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism was based on an analogy: an analogy 
between the world of nature and the individual human being, who begins by finding certain 
Beyond Reason 3 
characteristics in himself as an individual, and goes on to think of nature as possessed of 
similar characteristics.’ (Collingwood 1945: 8) 
 
The seeds of future confusion are already apparent though.  Logos is a term which embraces 
‘speech’, ‘true account’, ‘reason’, ‘rational faculty’ and even the organizing force of the 
universe, a polysemy reflected in its use in the rationality debate.  The relationship of human 
actions and natural events is dualistic and figurative: it is dichotomous and described by 
recourse to metaphor.  The problem is set up anthropocentrically, where the Other is 
described in ethnocentric terms.  It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that subsequent thinkers 
should try inversely to assimilate regularities in human behaviour to rational inquiry about 
nature, or natural science.  That this involves highly questionable presuppositions gets 
overlooked. 
 
Only scientific method rests on the required epistemological dualism of false and true 
belief...  Happily, the rationalist also finds that reality is actually constituted in accordance 
with the prerequisites of his method: facts exist independently, thus guaranteeing an 
observational core that permits detached understanding.  Even more fortunately, all this is 
said to rest on irrefutable ontological grounds: innate dispositions, primary theories and 
neurological constants. (Scholte 1984: 963) 
 
Rationality is part of a ‘totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges’ (Quine 1953: 42).  It has a long history, 
in the course of which it has acquired all sorts of vested interests. 
 
 It is a possible, and indeed popular, ploy to devise elaborate intellectual genealogies to 
demonstrate the ineluctable triumph of reason.  Metonymically these list heroes from Plato 
and Aristotle, through Descartes, Bacon and Kant, to such recent figures as Russell.  
Retrospectively one can also trace a loyal opposition from the Greek rhetoricians, through 
Sextus Empiricus and Vico, to Wittgenstein, on whom Winch drew for his vision of social 
science.[5]  A problem of the rationality debate is neatly captured by the appeal to such 
genealogies.  Are they a record of a cumulative and coherent account of the discovery of the 
conditions of true knowledge?  Or are they questionable reconstructions, in which problems 
of context and translation are conveniently swept aside, where genealogy becomes the claim 
to hegemony?  The first sees history, culture and translation as amenable to reason; the 
second argues the transparency is, at least partly, spurious and a vehicle of power.  Upon this 
difference hinges the question of whether there can ever be a neutral arena for debate at all.  
The participants disagree over the potentialities, or limits, of Western canons of reason, 
which form not just the object of discussion, but also its means; just as they disagree over the 
capacity of reason to transcend language and social context.  The style of the debate 
unwittingly reproduces its subject. 
 
 Here lies part of the problem.  Geoffrey Lloyd has argued that Greek philosophers’ 
interest in logic grew out of their discontent with the persuasive power of rhetoric (1979: 59-
125).  The attempt to ground argument in the ‘true’ knowledge achievable through reason 
may itself be regarded as another form of persuasion.  Reason is at once partly constitutive of 
Western history and yet those convoluted tracings of history itself make it very hard to read 
backwards with accuracy.  Anthropologists find it hard enough to make sense of informants 
whom they can question and ask for clarification on the spot.  How are we to interrogate a 
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past that both helps to constitute us and eludes us by its difference?  How can we be sure we 
understand the significance of what was said?  The ghosts of the past lurk in the background. 
 
 My concern here is not with erecting contestable genealogies of knowledge, but with 
how past intellectual practice permeates the terms of the debate.  A striking feature is the 
extent of reliance upon two related notions: essence and dichotomy.  Ideas about things 
having essences is closely linked to ideas of nature.  Phusis meant ‘the essence or nature of 
things’, ‘something inhering in these things which makes them behave as they did’ 
(Collingwood 1945: 81, 44).[6]  The essence of things can be understood by reason which, in 
turn, has its own essence.  It is this essence that rationalists claim to find in impure form 
under every ethnographic stone.  It is only because reason has essentially the same features 
everywhere that all its manifestations can be treated as of a kind, despite ostensible 
differences of language and context. 
 
 As things, on this view, either share an essence or do not, it is possible to speak of 
statements about them being true or false.  Essence underwrites dichotomy.  Either language 
accurately reflects the world or it doesn’t.  Either there are effective universal criteria of truth 
or these are culturally relative.  Either perception and reason are universally the same or they 
are so different we could never understand other people.  The critics of rationalism are often 
as guilty of assuming dichotomy as are its proponents.  Old habits die hard.  As if this were 
not enough, there is an irresistible urge to displace one’s worst habits onto others.[7]  The 
Dutch structuralist attribution of dualist thinking to great stretches of the globe (cf. Needham 
1973), or the insistence that primitives cannot escape thinking using analogy (Tambiah 1973; 
Horton 1979) are obvious examples.  As Lloyd has argued, however, such preferences 
epitomize ancient Greek styles of argumentation (1966).  A brief glance at the rationalists’ 
writings will show that those ghosts have not yet been laid to rest. 
 
 The twin themes of the centrality of reason, or logic, and the penchant for dichotomous 
thinking pervade the more recent history of the debate as well.  Lévy-Bruhl distinguished 
‘primitive thought’ by its breach of two of the ‘laws of thought’ (see Hobart 1985: 115-17).  
Where primitives believed something could participate in something else - as where someone 
says, for instance, of a Temiar tiger shaman, that he is both a man and a tiger - they were 
contravening the law of non-contradiction.  (On a different reading, it is the law of excluded 
middle that is at issue.)  That they might assert different views in different situations 
(Wolfram 1985) or that belief is a confused notion (Needham 1975) is irrelevant in a world 
where things have, or should have, essences as these are immutable in changing 
circumstances.  That the statements on which such sweeping judgements were made posed no 
problem of translation or knowledge of indigenous categories was taken for granted for the 
same reason.  Behind the assumption that human categories were everywhere the same looms 
the shadow of Kant.  For he had argued that reason showed that such basic categories as 
space, time, volume and so forth, were a priori.  They could never be inferred from 
experience.  In so arguing he established the philosophical practice, still faithfully adhered to, 
that evidence should never be allowed to get in the way of the armchair exercise of reason.[8]  
Moreover the rest stand dichotomously opposed to the West and help to constitute it.  The 
extent to which writers from Hegel and Marx to John Stuart Mill and the Romantics defined 
their philosophies by contrast to India is extraordinary, the more so as none of them of course 
ever bothered to set foot there or to exercise even a minimal critical faculty over the 
accuracy, or likelihood, of their sources.[9]  It was left to Durkheim to challenge Kant’s 
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assumption that the ultimate categories of experience could be reliably derived by reason 
alone.  Against this he argued that they are social in origin and so may, and indeed 
empirically do, vary across cultures.  With Durkheim, anthropologists entered the debate, 
ranged initially against the philosophers. 
 
 Parallel to the argument about the cultural nature of categories - and indeed the nature of 
reason itself - was a similar critique of a priorism by philosophers of history, starting with 
Hegel and Marx, and including, significantly for present purposes, Collingwood.  By showing 
the extent to which contemporary philosophical notions such as nature and reason are far 
from self-evident but emerge from a long history in which they are continually rephrased and 
reworked (1945, 1946), Collingwood arguably not only undermined the facile universalism 
of rationalism before the recent debate ever started, but also provided an alternative approach 
to the understanding of human action which avoids many of the pitfalls of past endeavours 
(see Hirst 1985a; Inden forthcoming; Hobart 1988 and in press).  If the shadow of Kant 
looms over philosophers, the shade of Collingwood hovers less visibly but just as pervasively 
behind the rationality debate.  For Evans-Pritchard, upon whose ethnography so much of the 
debate draws, was steeped in the work of Collingwood. 
 
 Collingwood has a more immediate relevance.  As I noted, whether to do with logic or 
with styles of classification, the debate about rationality is shot through with dichotomy.  For 
instance, it is widely argued that if one does not adhere to the universality of reason, or 
standard logic, one is ipso facto a relativist and is condemned to hold the culturally relative 
and situational nature of truth and/or perception.  Winch is often depicted as the archetype of 
such relativism where reality itself is effectively cast out.  As Skorupski has pointed out 
however, Winch’s position need not involve relativism in at least one sense (1978: 96-7).  I 
can think of few anthropologists who would embrace the anti-realism of which they are 
usually accused.[10]  Why then is the matter represented so dualistically?  The attribution 
rests on a false dichotomy by which one is either ‘a’ or ‘not-a’, ‘not-a’ being defined both 
negatively and from the point of view of proponents of ‘a’.  So ‘not-a’ is not just a residual 
category, it is likely to be incoherent from the start because it has been defined in terms of 
what it is not.  The apparent confusion of what we call ‘emotions’ stems in no small part from 
their being defined by contrast to ‘intellect’ by the very criteria used to define intellect in the 
first place. 
 
 Need so complex a set of issue as the nature of reason and perception be approached so 
simplistically?  Can one not, for instance, hold that different people may perceive objects and 
situations partly similarly, partly differently?  It would be pretty simple-minded to assume 
that a skilled landscape artist and a passing tourist both saw a particular countryside 
identically.  If people do not have identical ways of reasoning, does that mean they cannot 
communicate at all?  As one often finds even in close partnerships, may they not sometimes 
communicate clearly, sometimes not, sometimes partly?  In other words, we may need a 
logic, and an account of perception, which recognize differences of degrees and that 
differences of degree may be treated as differences of kind and vice versa in particular 
situations.  A formal logic of degrees is however still in its infancy (Haack 1978: 164-69). 
 
 Collingwood’s importance is that he recognized that such thinking has, in fact, been 
quietly at work in philosophical argument.  Instead of scientific and reflective thought being 
two dichotomously opposed ways of structuring reality, he noted that they are dialectically 
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related as successive phases in thinking and directed to questions which differ partly in kind, 
partly in degree and are directed towards answering partly different questions.  (Here he 
foreshadows work of the Frankfurt Critical School with its emphasis on knowledge being for 
a purpose.)  In the scientific phase, he suggested, phenomena are often treated as falling into 
unambiguous classes.  By contrast, in the properly philosophical phase (to which one might 
add much historical and anthropological thinking) it is possible to show that the concern is 
with how classes overlap and with the relation of differences of degree and kind 
(Collingwood 1933).  As such an approach is dialectical, neither science nor reflective 
thinking remains static.  They have histories in which earlier phases are reworked within, but 
may remain part of, later ones - hence the tendency towards dichotomy which is part of the 
approach under consideration here.[11]  The relevance of Collingwood is both that he does 
not deny the impact of the growth of scientific knowledge and that he outlines the basis for an 
approach of immediate use to anthropologists who must wrestle with statements which may 
not be couched as either/or but as both/and.  If anthropologists, like Sir Ruthven Ruddigore in 
the comic opera of that name, find themselves confronted by the ghosts of their intellectual 
forebears, at least one or two of them are friendly. 
 
 
Telling it as it is 
 
 Renewed interest in the contribution of anthropologists to arguments about the nature of 
rationality was sparked off by Winch’s reflections on Evans-Pritchard’s famous work on 
Azande witchcraft (1937) as forming a closed, coherent system of belief which was 
unfalsifiable in terms of its own cultural premises.  He accuses Evans-Pritchard of applying 
unjustified Western scientific and rational assumptions to Zande thought, thereby making 
them seem contradictory.  For 
 
the context from which the suggestion about the contradiction is made, the context of our 
scientific culture, is not at the same level as the context in which the beliefs about witchcraft 
operate.  Zande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of 
which Azande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world... it is the European, 
obsessed with pressing Zande thought where it would not naturally go - to a contradiction - 
who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the Zande.  The European is in fact committing a 
category mistake (1970: 93). 
 
In a famous passage, he substitutes the words ‘European’ and ‘Zande’ to argue that, from the 
point of a view of a Zande, Europeans would seem equally trapped in a closed world (1970: 
89).  A similar argument about the hermetic nature of Western scientific paradigms had, of 
course, been advanced on rather different philosophical grounds by Quine some years before 
(1953: 37-46). 
 
  Winch’s essay is an illustration of his earlier approach to understanding human social 
life.  There he attempted to adapt Collingwood, and the work of Max Weber on the need for 
an understanding (Verstehen) of social life from the ‘inside’, to a Wittgensteinian image of a 
culture as a distinct ‘form of life’ which could not be evaluated in terms of other forms 
(1958).  This included a direct attack on the universal application of reason as the basis of 
understanding.  For 
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criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the 
context of, ways of living or modes of social life.  It follows that one cannot apply criteria of 
logic to modes of social life as such. For instance, science is one such mode and religion is 
another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself (1958: 100) 
 
An obvious problem with this formulation was pointed out by MacIntyre in a delightful essay 
which suggests that if one understands religion it is no longer possible to believe in it.  
MacIntyre argues that, when people discover that their criteria do not yield a clear and 
ambiguous answer to a problem, they start questioning their own criteria and criticize their 
own standards of intelligibility and rationality.  He suggests that, on Winch’s account, it 
would be difficult to see how this would be possible (1970: 67-8).  Despite his criticisms, 
MacIntyre in fact shifted his ground subsequently to adopt a position far closer to Winch’s. 
 
 Gellner has also criticized Winch along similar lines, although this did not prevent 
Gellner from penning Winch and MacIntyre together in the same corral as ‘New Idealists’ 
(1973a, 1973b).  Gellner’s argument is part of a thoroughgoing critique of Winch’s position.  
He challenges what he sees as Winch’s idealism, his theory of meaning and his idea of a 
‘form of life’.  Winch, he considers, is profoundly mistaken in thinking that to understand a 
society is to understand its concepts, because ‘concepts are as liable to mask reality as to 
reveal it, and masking some of it may be part of their function’ (1970: 18, fn 1).  Rather ‘to 
understand the working of the concepts of a society is to understand its institutions’ (1970:18, 
emphasis in the original), not concepts as ideally conceived.  Following Wittgenstein, Winch 
argues that words do not have fixed essential meanings: meaning is given by use in a context.  
Gellner neatly points out the catch. 
 
If "meaning = use", then "use = meaning"... if the meaning of expressions is their 
employment, then, in turn, it is the essence of the employment of expressions (and by an 
independent but legitimate extension, of other social behaviour), that it is meaningful 
(1973a: 55, parentheses in the original) 
 
What is it, Gellner goes on, for an action to have meaning?  Winch’s error, on this reading, is 
to conflate ideas with the ways they are used and so fails to escape the essentialism he 
identifies and merely shifts it from meaning to use.[12]  The problem lies, Gellner suggests, 
in the notion of a ‘form of life’.  Winch takes this as a primary, unanalyzable given.  ‘What 
has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life.’ (1958: 40, citing 
Wittgenstein 1958: 226).  Now forms of life are synonyms for what anthropologists call 
societies or cultures and have formed the subject of detailed analysis for a long time. 
 
For the point about forms of life is that they do not always, or even frequently, accept 
themselves as given, as something to be accepted.  On the contrary, they often reject their 
own past practices as absurd, irrational etc. (1973a: 57) 
 
 Gellner’s criticism of philosophers like Winch and MacIntyre is that 
 
(a) they offer us guarantees that the stuff of human and social life is made up of thoughts, 
and (b) they offer us painless and uncheckable avenues towards alleged knowledge (1973b: 
85). 
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In short, they are preaching to anthropologists without knowing anything about society (and, 
one might add, of Winch especially, history has been overlooked).[13]  While many 
anthropologists share Gellner’s reservations, the kind of materialism he often advocates is not 
the full answer either.  At times he runs the risk of impaling himself on the horns of a false 
dilemma.  In order to understand social action we need not just the workings of concepts 
(‘concepts’ themselves easily become unhealthily Platonist) but a consideration of action, 
which may have precious little to do with ideas in the sense philosophers understand them.  
We also need to recognize the ways, and situations, in which the coherence, or otherwise, of 
ideas may have implications for action.[14]  Structuralism and hermeneutics are not the full 
answer, but nor are they entirely irrelevant.  Again we are caught in the either/or trap: either 
an analysis must be in terms of cause, or of meaning and reason - a Cartesian dichotomy 
some scholars have evidently not yet escaped from.  Gellner does, however, express a 
widespread anthropological concern that the philosophers who are busy telling 
anthropologists what they should be doing would not recognize a social action even if it were 
served up to them on a silver platter decorated with watercress. 
 
 As a final point, it is worth briefly noting Gellner’s comments on the risks of exclusive 
reliance on context.  The drawback of Evans-Pritchard’s method of making sense of initially 
puzzling statements by Azande is that anything can, or can be made to, make sense if one 
extends the context far enough (1970: 25-40).  Apart from its obvious relevance to 
hermeneutic and structuralist interpretations, Gellner’s point also holds for those brands of 
truth-conditional semantics which depend on a principle of charity in translation (e.g. 
Davidson 1974; Grandy 1973).  The argument is in danger of being circular: one has to 
presuppose humans always strive to make sense to show that they do. 
 
 The second part of Rationality centres on an interesting argument between Lukes and 
Hollis as to the relative status of culturally specific logics and Western standard logic.[15]  
Both are concerned once again to explore the philosophical problems arising from the 
practice of anthropologists and sociologists.  Lukes runs through various anthropological 
answers to the apparent problem of the rationality of ‘primitive magical and religious beliefs’ 
(1970: 194; one should note the extent to which the ‘problem’ has been massively pre-
structured).  He then offers ten replies to his own question: ‘What is it for a belief or set of 
beliefs to be irrational?’ (1970: 207-8).  Curiously, Lukes fails to distinguish logical from 
empirical truth, but not because he rejects the dichotomy.  He concludes by suggesting  
 
that some criteria of rationality are universal, i.e. relevantly applicable to all beliefs, in any 
context, while others are context-dependent, i.e. are to be discovered by investigating the 
context and are only relevantly applicable to beliefs in that context (1970: 208). 
 
He concludes that all beliefs are to be evaluated by both criteria.  During boring seminars, 
one can have great fun trying to imagine a belief which holds in every conceivable context. 
 
 Hollis’s dismissal of Lukes’s argument is an important turning point in the debate, both 
because of the grounds on which it reaffirms the necessary universality of standard logic and 
of perception, and because it introduces the much-cited idea of a translational bridgehead 
between cultures.  (It also demonstrates the persuasive power to a Western audience of a 
rhetoric of unambiguous dichotomy over the tentative exploration of overlapping classes).  
As Hollis puts it: 
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some overlap in concepts and percepts is a necessary condition of successful translation.  
The sine qua non is a bridgehead of true assertions about a shared reality (1970a: 216).[16] 
 
Two points should be noted immediately.  Overlap is introduced only to be rendered 
analytically obsolete.  And the bridgehead requires a sort of double bind between logic and 
perception.  They are mutually entailed; and one without the other is useless.  One wonders if 
it is chance that the more monoglot the author - and the British are notorious on this score - 
the less problems translation poses.  Could most Dutch, for instance, take so facile a view of 
languages and their histories? 
 
 Anyhow, Lukes gets short shrift.  Context-free criteria of rationality ‘are not so much 
universal as necessary’ and local criteria ‘are not so much context-dependent as optional’ 
(1970a: 218).  Context-free criteria are not a hypothesis in anthropology - because they are 
not refutable - they are the conditions of the possibility of translation.  So ‘a theorist of social 
anthropology must budget for a priori elements which are not optional’ (1970b: 238).  If 
others did not share identical perceptions and ways of verbalizing them, we could never know 
what they were talking about (or even know we were not?).  If they did not share the same 
logic, we could never understand them.[17]  (One might note that such an assumption would 
at best apply to the categorematical elements of discourse and the world, and would omit 
syncategorems.)  Here we encounter unmediable dichotomy.  Either everyone else perceives 
and reasons just as we (a loose deictic term, see Lyons 1977: 636-724, used to cover some or 
all philosophers, Europeans or whom?) do, or they are unintelligible.  In fact statements 
which defy these canons may well be ruled as impossible a priori.  That communication may 
be a matter of degree is excluded ab initio, despite Wallace’s well-argued case that 
communication depends on equivalence structures, not identity of conceptual structures 
(whatever those would look like), and that society might well be impossible if people did 
actually communicate clearly (1961: 29-44). 
 
 Hollis does however level a pertinent charge (one reiterated later by Newton-Smith and 
Sperber, both 1985) against anthropologists who reject out of hand recourse to some kind of 
bridgehead (1970b: 238-9).  It is that, whatever their theoretical claims, in practice when an 
anthropologist begins work in a culture with a radically different language, he or she assumes 
shared perception and logic in order to understand what people say.  This is quite correct, but 
to conclude that it follows that perceptual and logical bridgeheads therefore exist is 
unwarranted and counter-factual.  Ethnographers do indeed start, as a pragmatic measure, 
with such assumptions, which are sooner or later discarded as inadequate aids to 
understanding indigenous discourse.  Even for trusty old materialist stand-bys like land, 
labour and capital, as Tribe has argued cogently, discourse varies too much across historical 
periods and cultures (1978, 1981).  Assuming identity of meaning starts a wild goose chase, 
which does not, of course, stop people doing so.  As I am sure other anthropologists will 
agree, when one is confronted with people saying things one has enormous difficulty 
grasping, to understand what is going on an ethnographer would at times quite happily sell 
his or her grandmother, were she handy, let alone use a mere bridgehead for all it were worth. 
 
 A striking feature of the philosophical arguments discussed is their indifference to 
ethnographic evidence.  This attitude sticks the craw of most anthropologists who are often 
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unaware that it rests upon the important difference between the context of discovery (what 
ethnographers do) and the context of justification (what philosophers do 
 
For the rationalist, Western scientific method - however incomplete in fact - is in theory the 
ideal vehicle for the eventual achievement of true rationality.  Only scientific method rests 
on the required epistemological dualism between the context of discovery and the context of 
verification (Scholte 1984: 963). 
 
Discovery may proceed irrationally and without any coherent method: justification, or more 
pompously verification, must be orderly.  Is such a dichotomy between a more or less 
disorderly world of fact and a tidy abstract realm of ideas a necessary condition of true 
knowledge? 
 
the question is to what extent the distinction drawn reflects a real difference and whether 
science can advance without a strong interaction between the separated domains 
(Feyerabend 1975: 166). 
 
In other words, are these classes exclusive or do they overlap?  And how far is the dichotomy 
itself justified by scientific practice?  An analysis of the history and philosophy of science 
suggests there is a strong case for  
 
abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification and 
disregarding the related distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms.  
Neither distinction plays a role in the practice of scientific practice.  Attempts to enforce 
them would have disastrous consequences (Feyerabend 1975: 165). 
 
It is surely incumbent upon rationalists to answer the critics within their own discipline 
before imposing their ideals - but not their own practice - on the rest of the world with 
‘disastrous consequences’.  Shorn of their epistemological justification which itself depends 
on cultural presuppositions, the philosophers look at best naive, at worst disingenuous.  At an 
Association of Social Anthropologists’ conference a few years ago, a young speaker who had 
never done fieldwork berated the profession on its poor record of ethnography and explained 
how it should be done.  A friend of mine leant over to me and murmured: ‘Isn’t it wonderful.  
And the furthest he has been is to Boulogne on a day trip’.  It is not just football hooligans 





 In Rationality the philosophical argument centred largely on the relevance of context in 
ethnographic understanding, epitomized by Winch’s rather idealist reading of Wittgenstein, 
while the dispute over the status of rationality per se between Lukes and Hollis brought up 
the tail.  By 1982, when Hollis and Lukes had buried their differences sufficiently to be able 
to co-edit Rationality and relativism,[18] the rational tail had come to wag the ethnographic 
dog.  The issue at stake is defined in the Introduction as the stark dichotomy between 
rationality (unspecified) and relativism (relatively strong or weak) of five kinds: moral, 
conceptual, perceptual, of truth and of reason.  Relativists (sic) are invited to answer various 
charges as to what their purported stance involves.  These are worth brief consideration. 
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 As the editors question the clear distinction between moral and conceptual relativism, 
and break the latter down into four sets of problems, for the moment I shall follow them and 
defer till later the question of morality and the relativity of values.  The first distinguishable 
kind of relativism then is conceptual. 
 
Different groups and cultures order their experience by means of different concepts.  The 
order which they find is notoriously not given to them directly by experience... That some 
concepts are relative in this way to context is undeniable.  That all are, and more particularly 
the basic categories of thought themselves, is the challenging thought (1982: 6-7, emphases 
in the original). 
 
The argument rests upon an ontological distinction between experience and concepts, and the 
idea that it is possible unambiguously to identify ‘basic categories of thought’.  The idea that 
one can usefully talk of human experience independent of culture, history and language 
presupposes not only a radical difference between biological and social humans (there are 
few asocial humans around), but also that Mind reflects the world exactly, or at least in a 
necessarily identical manner.[19]  The first involves a questionable dichotomy; the second a 
dubious visual metaphor (see Rorty 1980; Salmond 1982); the last begs the interesting 
questions (as critics of Lévi-Strauss have pointed out).  Now ‘concept’ may be an old and 
highly equivocal philosophical notion but, in the present context, it implies a mental realm of 
ideas of some kind.  Arguably ‘conceptualization on any considerable scale is inseparable 
from language’ (Quine 1960: 3).  If this is so, then the dichotomy between experience and 
concepts is false because they are both linked by language in use.  Far from posing a problem 
for ‘relativists’, Lukes and Hollis pose a problem for themselves. 
 
 A more serious problem is posed by the question of perceptual relativism.  The editors 
are forced though to go as far back as Edward Sapir, co-founder of the ‘Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis’, to find a suitable straw man.  It is significant that they choose to cite Sapir as 
arguing that different societies live in ‘distinct worlds’ (1982: 7, emphasis in the original, 
1929: 209) rather than face one of their own critics in Goodman’s challenge that ‘there is no 
way that is the way the world is; and so of course no description can capture it’ (1972: 31).  
Hollis and Lukes identify two related ideas in Sapir. 
 
One is that what we perceive cannot be explained by the nature of the object perceived... 
The other is the specific diagnosis that language in some sense determines or constitutes 
what is perceived (1982: 8). 
 
The first hides a closet exclusive classification.  Either perception is (completely or 
adequately) explained by the nature of an object, or it is, in some sense, not at all.  More 
serious is the hidden assumption that there are properties or some kind of essence in objects, 
which determines how they are perceived. There is little recognition that the relationship of 
objects and what is made of them need not be fully determined so that they may be 
appreciated in different ways in different circumstances.  The second point is interesting.  It 
assumes that language is a homogeneous entity (all language ‘determines’ or ‘constitutes’ 
perception in the same way and to the same degree in all cultures).  It recapitulates the 
dichotomy just mentioned and ignores the possibility that reality and language may be related 
dialectically.  So far from this last being relativist, it is an excellent ground on which to argue 
a hard realist case (see Bhaskar 1979, 1986; Sayers 1985).  Their own determined dualism 
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pushes the editors into the position of denying the existence of discourses with their own 
history, possibilities and closures. 
 
 The fourth relativism is of truth.  Are ‘relativists’ claiming that propositions and 
sentences are not true or false in reality?  
 
What is true for the Hopi is not so for us; what is true for Aristotle is not so for Galileo... A 
sentence cannot be true in one language and false in another (1982: 9). 
 
Leaving aside the implicit equation of the problem of other minds and other cultures,[20] the 
rationalist contributors to the volume are divided among themselves as to whether reality is 
captured by propositions (Sperber) or sentences (Newton-Smith).  Both, incidentally, involve 
recourse to a dated correspondence theory of truth and meaning (see Hobart 1982).  The 
problem would be far worse were they seriously to admit utterances, which is the form 
sentences commonly take in human discourse. They conflate ‘the relations between word and 
sentence meaning, on the one hand, and speaker’s meaning or utterance meaning, on the 
other’ (Searle 1979: 93).  Propositions belong to the same dubious mental world as concepts.  
It presupposes that ‘meanings of sentences are exalted as abstract entities in their own right, 
under the name of propositions.’ (Quine 1970: 2, emphasis in the original).[21]  If truth 
depends on sentences as in truth-conditional semantics, by a comic twist, Sperber emerges as 
a leading opponent of universal truth conditions (see Sperber and Wilson 1982, 1986).  Much 
could, and has, been said about such truth-conditional approaches.  I shall merely observe 
here that its applicability to natural languages is open to question even by its proponents like 
Davidson and that it involves a complex ontology of meta-levels and so a metaphysics which 
has a distinctly essentialist and ethnocentric reek. 
   
 The editors pose ‘a further question of whether or not there is a common stock of non-
relative observational truths which serve to anchor communication’ (1982: 9).  The question, 
however, rests not only upon an interesting metaphor (‘anchoring’), but also upon the myth of 
perfect communication discussed above.  Second it presupposes an isomorphism of world 
and mind.  Third, reference to the common stock of truths is a paraphrasing of Hollis’s 
bridgehead and, as Overing remarks, not only can its content not be determined a priori, but it 
is unclear how one is to decide what to put in it or not (1985b: 155).  Finally, once again the 
question assumes a copy theory of representation (that, somehow, communication copies 
truth, cf. Goodman 1968: 3-43) and the absence or irrelevance of matters of genre and style in 
‘scientific’, let alone other, discourses.  There is a fascinating difference between how natural 
scientists talk to one another and the language of legitimation of professional publications in 
which they justify what they say. 
 
 This is far from the end.  The editors are concerned to block recourse to philosophy of 
science in the form of Feyerabend’s argument that theories are incommensurable and Quine’s 
that theories are underdetermined by evidence.  If there is a common stock, the relativist 
‘owes us an account of how theories (scientific and otherwise) relate to the observational data 
and can be specified, identified as alternative and, indeed, known to be incommensurable’ 
(1982: 9).  That, most anthropologists tend to argue, is at least partly an empirical question.  
Arguing that theory is underdetermined is no help, Hollis and Lukes suggest, because 
practising anthropologists and historians of science ‘must surely believe that they can 
succeed, at least in principle, in identifying what their subjects believe’ (1982: 10).  For a 
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start, few anthropologists nowadays imagine belief as some mystical ‘inner state’: they are 
concerned rather with what people say they believe (see Needham 1972).  The interest is in 
speech and action in public space.  (On this notion see Taylor 1985a: 277.  Taylor’s inclusion 
the volume in question as in Rationality and relativism is delightful because, in most of his 
writing, he is a brilliant scourge of ahistorical, transparent notions of truth, meaning and 
action.)  There is no ground to assume that actions are caused by belief (sic) in any simple 
way, as to do so would be to assume some determinate theory of the relation of belief or 
meaning and action.  Finally, if slightly rhetorically, anthropologists are asked ‘how can they 
stomach a further thought that what is to be translated is itself relative to a translation 
manual?’ (1982: 10).  The short answer is ‘quite easily’.  The slightly longer one is first that 
exploring different translational manuals is sobering and inhibits facile generalization (Hobart 
1987: 37-44); second that people themselves may make use of different interpretive schemes 
in puzzling over the significance of statements and events. 
 
 The final form of relativism is relativity of reason.  Unfortunately the contributors to the 
volume disagree so much over what reason is that it is totally unclear what kind of reason is 
supposed to be relative.  Until they sort it out there is no coherent question to answer.  Hollis 
maintains that criteria of reason are a priori, Lukes sees them as partly culturally variable, 
Hacking argues there to be different styles of reasoning, Newton-Smith and Gellner argue 
such criteria are what may be shown a posteriori to be effective, Taylor refuses to equate 
rationality with logic at all (and elsewhere explicitly denies an ahistorical, acultural model of 
perception, 1985b).  In fact Hollis and Newton-Smith are diametrically opposed and disagree 
with each other.  It is worth considering Hollis’s argument in slightly more detail for two 
reasons.  Most anthropologists who argue a non-rationalist case are primarily concerned to 
rebut the a priori determination of the necessary conditions of perception, truth and reason 
that they must use. 
 
 After an argument which takes many twists and turns, Hollis points out the dangers in 
treating rationality not as a priori but as a investigable variable.  If one pursues the latter 
course however  
 
both ontology and epistemology are relative to shared belief and, in principle, variable 
without constraint, beyond that of overall coherence.  Since the criteria of coherence are 
themselves included in epistemology, it ought to follow, that there are no constraints at all... 
What sets off as an insight into the construction of social objects ends as the sceptical 
destruction of reality (1982: 82-3). 
 
Hollis sees only two ways of ‘stopping the rot’.  The first is to restore the independence of 
facts, to reaffirm an objective natural world (viewed, one might add, by discursively 
impartial, potentially all-knowing subjects).  He admits though, with ironic understatement, 
that the upheaval in the philosophy of science means ‘this is easier said than done’ (1982: 
83). 
 
 With his usual clarity, Hollis recognizes the inescapability of metaphysical 
presuppositions in any programmatic rationalist approach. 
 
The other way, then, is to place an a priori constraint on what a rational man can believe 
about his world. On transcendentalist grounds there has to be that "massive central core of 
human thinking which has no history" and it has to be one which embodies the only kind of 
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rational thinking there can be.  The "massive central core" cannot be an empirical 
hypothesis, liable in principle to be falsified in a variety of human cultures but luckily in 
fact upheld... There has to be an epistemological unity of mankind (1982: 83-4, citing, in the 
quotation marks, Strawson 1959: 10, who incidentally says ‘there is’, not ‘there has to be’). 
 
For all his earlier disavowals, Hollis is close to Quine here in stressing the totality of 
conceptual schemes, but it leaves him, as it did Quine, with no epistemological ground for 
believing ‘in physical objects and not in Homer’s gods’ (1953: 44). 
 
 This is well and good, but it doesn’t help rationalists to establish the universality of 
reason and perception empirically.  For many years Horton has been trying to do precisely 
this.  His first attempt, reprinted in Rationality, set out to show the superiority of Western 
medicine over African.  Unfortunately it was flawed from the start on two counts.  First, it 
described African medicine in terms of Western categories, thereby skewing the analysis 
before it began.  Second, it contrasted the practice of African medicine with the theory of 
Western medicine.  The sweeping designations reveal the essentialism latent in much 
rationalist argument.  Africa and the West presumably each have such essential and 
distinctive features that one can generalize about them, as presumably one can about their 
respective ‘medicines’.  Subsequently Horton went on to develop an argument which bids to 
include language.[22]  He too draws on Strawson to suggest we must distinguish two kinds of 
language or framework: material-object and theoretical.[23]  His vision is of 
 
the everyday material-object framework as operating at all times and places in conjunction 
with one or more theoretical frameworks, but which stresses the multifarious dependence of 
the latter upon the former...(and) it is where everyday language reaches the limits of its 
competence that theoretical language comes into play... Theory performs its functions, not 
by introducing entirely new linguistic and conceptual resources, but by extending and 
indeed ‘stretching’ the resources of everyday discourse (1979: 206, 208). 
 
 We are given little evidence for the universality of material-object language (itself a 
metaphor, for it is obviously not natural language).  Horton draws again on his deeply suspect 
paper of 1967 and adds such profound parallels between generic Africa and an equally 
generic West as ‘both sets of cultures share the same everyday abhorrence of contradiction’ 
(1979: 208).  Despite a further attempt (1982) to bolster his case against his critics (who 
range from Hollis 1979 to Overing 1985b) ‘he does not measurably alter his conviction that 
the West has developed cognitive proclivities that the Rest did not’ (Scholte 1984: 964). 
 
 As Hollis notes, Horton is treating what Strawson takes as axiomatic as empirically 
demonstrable (1979: 228-9).  This, incidentally, makes Horton run the risk of petitio principii 
by assuming what he tries to show.  We are offered a universal account of the genesis of 
language: it starts with simple objects and gradually fills out ad hoc the theory which merely 
serves to plug the gaps in everyday life when they become too obvious.  Not even Lévi-
Strauss took bricolage that far.  We really are back to the savage with a bone through his nose 
vainly puzzling his way through the world by ‘concrete operations’ (Hallpike 1979: 19-27).  
What Horton seems to be doing is trying to explain the survival of homo sapiens around the 
world which appears to him to require some basic cognitive capacities.  However we do not 
need to postulate a shared language or framework for that.  If one accepts Quine’s under-
determination thesis, it does not follow from the fact of survival in an material environment 
that one has to have the same model of reality to do so.  There is more than one way of 
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surviving in life, just as there is more than one way of skinning a cat.  Not everyone is 
successful, including City whiz-kids.  Of claims to a universal material-object language one 
can only conclude quod non erat demonstrandum. 
 
 Finally, a closely related argument needs brief mention.  This is Sperber’s endeavour to 
erect a general theory of ‘encyclopaedic’ knowledge on reality (e.g. 1975).  Such knowledge 
is, and only can be, grounded in true propositions.  Sperber has therefore understandably set 
about demonstrating that all odd-looking statements which people make are so either because 
they have missed out the intervening steps in inference or broadened the context too much 
(Sperber and Wilson 1982), or because they are semi-propositional (that is they contain a 
crude groping after truth but have not yet got there).  Such faulty knowledge is not useless 
however. 
 
Our capacity to form semi-propositional representations gives us the means to process 
information – and in particular verbal information - which exceeds our conceptual 
categories (1982: 170). 
 
Theory, here, by contrast to Horton, is hardly the unnecessary icing on the cake of 
understanding and dealing with real reality: it is the precondition of being able to extend 
encyclopaedic knowledge.  What Sperber is offering us is a form of logical positivism, 
backed up by the dubious arsenal of concepts, propositions and neutral observers of a real 
world, and coupled to a very ancient theory of signs dating back to Aristotle (see Todorov 
1977).  Plus ça change, plus c’ est la même chose.  The most remarkable feature of Sperber’s 
work is that he is able to write as he does in contemporary France where everything he takes 
for granted has long been under serious question. 
 
 Sperber is not alone in this.  What is so striking about the debate in Rationality and 
Rationality and relativism is its degree of closure: both to anything outside its own narrow 
purview and to its reliance on a battery of self-evident seeming presuppositions.  Like farce, 
each episode seems uniquely logical, but each person tends to land up at odds with everyone 
else.  Like farce too, the rationalists’ argument depends on profoundly conservative values.  It 
is the bellow of a brontosaurus from the slough of intellectual despond who is angry that the 
climate is changing. 
 
 Let me clarify what I mean.  Hollis is the most honest about it all.  He recognizes ‘the 
upheaval in the philosophy of natural science’ (1982: 83), but still sticks to the idea of a 
‘natural science’ at a time such naturalism is under attack.  It is a vision that requires objects 
to have essential properties which determine their perception by Mind (all possible minds) 
guaranteed by a fortune isomorphism between nature and Mind.  As Hollis makes clear, not 
only does rationalism of this kind require the psychic unity of mankind, i.e. the world view of 
one strand of Western philosophy, but it requires methodological individualism (1977: 185-
90), the presupposition of ultimately pre-social biological entities who register the world 
objectively through language which is a conveniently homogeneous, neutral medium.[24]  
Rationalism is an attempt to regress to the bygone era of a confident science, where 
knowledge is encyclopaedic and facts are facts; and scientists own both.  It is a nostalgic 
world where one did not have to worry about paradigms (Kuhn 1962, 1977), alternative 
explanations of the same set of facts (Quine 1960), the nature of representation (Goodman 
1968, 1972; Baudrillard 1983) or academic discourse (Foucault 1969, 1971), nor about 
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whether scientific and philosophical language was shot through with metaphor (Derrida 
1982; Ortony 1979; Sachs 1979) still less that, ironically, anthropology might be the 
appropriate tool to understand science itself (Feyerabend 1975: 223-287).  The contrary of 
relativism in this sense is not rationalism but absolutism.  What we have been surveying is a 
regime of truth and so an economy of power (Foucault 1977), a justification for the continued 
hegemony of certain interests in the West over the Rest.[25] 
 
 
The empire strikes back 
 
 The most recent contribution to the debate at the time of writing is Reason and morality, 
edited by Joanna Overing.  As the papers were originally presented to a conference of the 
Association of Social Anthropologists, their flavour is distinctly different from previous 
offerings.  It is one thing to engage philosophers in their own discourse.  It is another to run 
the gauntlet of specialists in one’s own field.  The latter, in this instance, require theory to be 
of some use in illuminating ethnography, in which British social anthropologists are dipped 
on their academic initiation and periodically re-immersed to ward off excessive theoretical 
infestation.  Despite this, one reason for choosing rationality as the theme of the conference 
was the widespread discontent with the tendency among philosophers, operating in an ideal 
world and in almost total ignorance of ethnography and the history of anthropological 
discourse, to tell anthropologists what they can and cannot find and what it means. 
 
 So the volume faces two ways.  On the one hand, the anthropological contributors are 
concerned with understanding the richness of their respective ethnographies in ways 
proscribed a priori by rationalist straightjackets.  Unlike their philosophical counterparts it 
seems, anthropologists are, however, increasingly having to cope with the implications of 
recognizing that their writings have their own discursive history.  The issue is particularly 
pertinent insofar as their ethnographic descriptions attain part of their authority not from the 
subtlety of their engagement with the lives of others, but from their status within a Western 
intellectual discourse (Clifford 1983; Clifford and Marcus 1986; cf. Fardon 1988).  This 
leaves anthropologists betwixt and between.  Ethnographic writing runs the risk of helping to 
perpetuate a hegemonic tradition which denies others a share in their own representation.  
Yet, at the same time, such writing can be profoundly subversive of this tradition (see 
Strathern 1985).  The irony in attempts to redress the balance is that it still requires 
Westerners to talk on behalf of other peoples. 
 
 While these issues are currently very much in the air, in order to make room for new 
kinds of description, the contributors must also reply to the rationalists on the other hand.  
They do so on two broad grounds.  Theoretically they make use of the critics of ‘normal 
science’ and suggest that rationalists should answer their own critics before prescribing 
‘essentially contested’ programmes to others.  Most also take the line that, as the rationalists 
have succeeded in showing in the words of Peter Sellars that ‘existing conditions are 
unlikely’, there may be something fundamentally flawed in a programme which denies the 
possibility of what ethnographers regularly encounter.  (Put more formally, there is a shift 
from the certitudes of one epistemological tradition to the investigation of alternative 
ontologies and epistemologies.)  In other words, reason is too important to be left to the 
rationalists who have made such a hash of it and it is time to explore how people actually 
argue, construct and contest the worlds in which they live. 
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 The contributors to Reason and morality who engage the rationalists start with rather 
different assumptions.  To the extent that these assumptions are incommensurable, the 
engagement has at times the quality of trains passing in the night.  Both sides may carry on 
regardless and happily.  This seems not unduly to worry those contributors who were reared 
on Quine and Feyerabend.[26]  Among the assumptions, which are largely shared, but 
differently interpreted by the authors, are that language and culture - or discourse - not only 
mediate between the world and humans, but partly and dialectically constitutes humans as 
agents.  In other words, there can be no neutral observer, independent of his or her cultural 
history, just as there can be no neutral description.  The lesson which is drawn from the 
rationality debate is not just that rationalists recapitulate the closure they attribute to, and 
displace onto, others, but that the claims to neutrality of such closure is itself part of the 
exercise of power.  Far from adopting relativism, the starting point is not one of 
epistemological closure, which would lead to a hopeless incommensurability, a logocentric 
‘prison-house of language’ (Derrida 1967; Jameson 1972).  However, to the extent that 
humans are constituted by discourse, this gives new impetus to the study of the long history 
of contact, conflict and domination between the West and the world which it so industriously 
conquered and latterly claimed to ‘develop’.  The discourses are rarely completely separate: 
they overlap.  Anthropologists live in a world of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ languages (Asad 1986), 
where power and knowledge are inextricably intertwined. 
 
 Two points of more immediate relevance follow from this sort of stance.  First, if there is 
no neutral description, for better or for worse, it is not possible to provide a neutral account of 
the rationality debate.  Nor does this account pretend to be one.  Second, what may seem self-
evident at any moment later looks curiously dated.  Reason and morality, like its 
predecessors, is part of an argument in history and we do not know where it will lead, nor 
how it will retrospectively appear to future generations.  It has therefore been easier to 
comment on works, which have already been debated and criticized than one which is only 
just coming up for critical scrutiny.  On both counts therefore I shall keep my remarks on the 
main contributions to Reason and morality short and leave further judgement to later 
commentators. 
 
 This said, some of the papers bear directly on the debate to date and are worth 
summarizing briefly.  A theme that runs through several contributions and which follows a 
questioning of the neutrality of description, is the inherently value-laden nature of thought 
(cf. Putnam 1978).  The possibility of neutrality effectively presupposes that natural scientific 
knowledge (Naturwissenschaften) can subsume human knowledge (Geisteswissenschaften, 
another dubious dichotomy).  As Overing notes, however 
 
usually the philosophers are not asking social questions; usually anthropologists are not 
asking for universal criteria of truth.  Anthropologists are asking about moral universes, 
their basic duty being to understand the intentions and objectives of actors within particular 
social worlds, as well as what these actors say, understand, believe truth and those worlds to 
be, a task of metaphysical description (1985a: 4, emphases in the original). 
 
Two points are of interest.  First, Overing recognizes that different cognitive interests will 
affect the kind of knowledge sought and achieved (cf. Habermas 1968; Apel 1979).  Second, 
she introduces the problem of differences between absolute presuppositions, i.e. metaphysics, 
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directly into the field of anthropological interest.  The dichotomy of fact and value is better 
not presumed but its possible formulations and uses explored in different situations. 
 
 The rationalists’ penchant for dichotomous thinking comes under sustained attack, 
whether it be the opposition between fact and value (Overing 1985a), literal and metaphoric 
meaning, or cause and meaning (Overing 1985b; Hobart 1985) intellect and emotion, mind 
and body (Parkin 1985), the rational and irrational (Wolfram 1985), or rationality and 
relativism (Hirst 1985b).  The purpose of introducing such dichotomies is less negatively 
critical of the rationalists than a means of exploring their consequences for discourses about 
other cultures.  Parkin, for instance, uses the ways in which the Giriama of East Africa speak 
about mind, body and emotion to deconstruct academic and popular categories of mind and 
body in contemporary English.  As he makes clear ‘the grand academic debate (between 
rationality and relativism) is itself epistemologically couched in folk usage’ (1985: 136, my 
parentheses).  And Wolfram examines the ways in which irrationality is decentred in 
rationalist discussion, which leaves it an incoherent and largely unexplored notion (there are 
shades of Foucault on madness here, 1961). 
 
 A dichotomy which rationalists often use to dissect discourse is that between literal and 
metaphorical use of language, a distinction which we saw earlier is linked to the genesis of 
logic itself among the Greeks.  This does not prevent the argument being fought out ad 
nauseam, if still informatively (see Ortony 1979; Sachs 1979).  Although some approaches 
take a less dismissive attitude to metaphor (e.g. Searle 1979; Culler 1981), the common 
modus operandi of rationalists is to distinguish literal from metaphorical thought and to try to 
explain the latter away or to see it as a stage in the cognitive evolution towards true 
knowledge (e.g. Sperber).[27]  The problem with this is the extent to which science and 
rationality themselves can be argued to be pervaded or even constituted metaphorically.[28]  
It is, however, by no means clear whether one can usefully talk of literal language at all 
(Hesse 1984).  Overing makes highly original use of the confusion to advance a serious case 
for applying Goodman’s work on multiple (and real) worlds to her ethnography. 
 
the recent emphasis on the cognitive respectability of metaphor in its linkage with la langue 
and rationality has privileged metaphor as a sort of metaphor of figurality, as a king of 
tropes.  I argue that it is time for us to withdraw the metaphoric safety net which lies 
beneath us.  Instead, we should view literal statements about the world as such, no matter 
how strange their content, rather than treat them as merely another example of the 
differentiating structure of the mind at work - or merely "as a code which makes it possible 
to pass from one system to the next"... I also wish to argue that the implication of 
withdrawing such a net does not involve the issue of one or another type of cognitive 
process: to withdraw it is rather a matter of accepting the reality of alien truths for the alien 
(1985b: 154, emphases in the original). 
 
We are being asked, in short, to consider radically different ontologies and not a priori to 
reduce the problem to one of epistemology.  It is an approach that, as Overing shows, makes 
far better sense of the complex cosmologies of South American Indians, like the Piaroa, than 
does the metaphysically over-burdened approach of Lévi-Strauss.  It is also notably an 
attempt to take seriously what people in other cultures say and do. 
 
 A similar concern to avoid imposing alien discourses on others lies behind another 
approach taken in Reason and morality.  This is to tackle the issue of reason head on.  
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Salmond (1985) provides an elegant account of how Maori and Europeans in New Zealand 
passed one another by, because not only were their absolute presuppositions about the nature 
of the world and knowledge incommensurable, but the styles of reasoning they employed 
were different and led to endless confusion.  Philosophers who wish to assert the 
epistemological unity of humankind could usefully address themselves to her argument and 
material (which develops her earlier exploration of contrasting cultural metaphors of 
knowledge, 1982).  In my own contribution I tried to show that Balinese, in practice, make 
regular use of culturally recognized forms of reasoning, derived from Indian Nyaya-Vaisesika 
philosophical schools, which had a highly developed critical tradition of logical inquiry.  
According to Hollis, this is impossible, which is rather unfortunate for the Indians, but still 
more so for Hollis.  It is awkward when what one has proved impossible happens.  Balinese 
logical usage differs from Western two-value logic in important respects.  Apart from 
employing a quite distinct, and more dialogic, form of syllogistic reasoning, the key terms of 
its syllogistic logic are subtly different.  In place of a dichotomy of ‘true’ and ‘false’, a 
distinction is made between correct inferences in discourse and what is manifest in the world 
and what not (1985: 112-15).  What is discursively true and manifest are not exclusive 
classes.  Neither are what is manifest and what not.  Something may not be manifest but still 
be the case; and the non-manifest may be latent within the manifest.  In other words we are 
dealing with a system of overlapping classes.  Balinese use their reasoning to explore 
collective representations, like statements about divinities, which are unclear to them.  
Examination of such inquiry shows Balinese to use a highly developed semantic vocabulary, 
including notions of figurative language that are quite distinctive.  So attempts to classify 
Balinese statements in terms of Western categories is a category mistake, which serves 
merely to render them incoherent. 
 
 One does not have to buy an expensive air ticket to explode some of the myths about 
rationality, although it may help.  Closer to home, Wolfram notes that little attention is paid 
by logicians to the distinction between believing and asserting.  One is not justified in 
inferring from someone asserting something that they necessarily believe it (an idea, as we 
saw, fraught with difficulty).  She then turns to examine social activities where contradictory 
or false statements are intentionally asserted without necessarily being irrational: 
 
someone may assert p, which is false, as a kindness, a courtesy, a joke, to avoid a quarrel, to 
win a vote, to get a proposal accepted, to insult, provoke, bewilder, mislead and so on 
(1985: 76). 
 
A stress on speech as part of social action cuts across the divide between a physical world of 
events and a mental world of propositions and allows one to explore the ways in which 
language is used.  The charge of idealism may more obviously be levelled against the 
rationalists than against their detractors.  The imputation of relativism works little better, as 
Hirst shows, in an clear reconsideration of the two philosophical relativists in Rationality and 
relativism (Barnes and Bloor 1982; Hacking 1982; Hirst’s analysis has in turn been criticized 
by Mann 1986).  In a detailed analysis of European witch-hunts from the Middle Ages, he 
points out that, granted the knowledge available at the time, it was far more rational to 
believe (sic) in witches than to deny their existence.  Feyerabend has argued, on similar 
grounds, that not only was Galileo (a great rationalist hero) irrational, logically and 
empirically, in challenging the heliocentric view of the world, but that he had to falsify his 
reasoning to make his case (1975: 69-143). 
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 It would be inappropriate to draw any firm epistemological conclusions from an 
argument which threatens, like the British Carry On films, to carry on for ever.  That does not 
mean though that reflection on the debate does not have a moral.  Nor does recognizing that 
one may not be able rigorously to separate fact from value pitch one into moral relativism. 
 
 The rationality debate in its heyday was distinguished by its closure.  Not only did it 
ignore anything (and that means almost everything) in recent continental scholarly 
discussion,[29] it also had to exclude much recent British and American work in analytical 
philosophy and philosophy of science.  These pale beside the significance of the refusal to 
allow the subjects of the debate to speak for themselves or in any terms other than those laid 
down in advance.  What is most worrying is that the exclusion and the silence imposed on 
other people is taken for granted as reasonable and self-evident.  The fact that, in the 1980s, 
intelligent Europeans can still seriously set themselves up as pinnacle of human achievement 
and civilization, and as the arbiters of the mental abilities of most of the rest of the world 
would be incredible were it not actually happening.  In the event, the existence of the 
rationality debate is a grave indictment of the British academic establishment.  So much is 
obvious.  History, even in the groves of academe however, does not stand still.  So, perhaps 
one should ask instead whether any good is likely to come from the debate in the end.  Will 
its conclusion be ‘pleasant and desirable’ and so after all prove a comedy in Dante’s sense?  
One could certainly wish that, like the Divine Comedy, its style were ‘unpretending’ and 
more attention were paid to how humans actually act and speak, that it recognized ‘the vulgar 
tongue in which women and children speak’ - and anthropologists to boot.  If only the 
rationalists would condescend to consider where their logic leads them. 
 
Dinanzi a me non fuor cose create 





1. Some readers may find it inappropriate of me to draw a connexion between trivial 
entertainment and argument over ultimate philosophical questions.  I must confess that I 
am struck by similarities in the structure of argument and the cultural allocation of roles 
in the two.  Behind this is a more serious point, namely that, whatever the differences in 
‘content’, discourse depends on conventions of narrative, which tend to be overlooked 
especially where the subject matter is held to be serious.  It is instructive to set aside 
cultural evaluation of genres for a moment and to consider how far these are variations on 
a theme or, as here, ironic commentary. 
2. Other important sources include Modes of thought eds. Horton and Finnegan (1973); 
Action and interpretation: studies in the philosophy of the social sciences. (1978) eds. 
Hookway and Pettit, and Philosophical disputes in the social sciences (1979) ed. Brown.  
As the argument is also fought out over the status of metaphor, one should perhaps add 
the collections of papers edited by Ortony Metaphor and thought and Sachs On metaphor 
(both 1979).  The bibliographies of these works give some idea of the amount of other 
contributions, more or less direct, to the general theme. 
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3. This paper was delivered as a lecture shortly before Scholte’s sudden and untimely death.  
As we were in substantial agreement over the significance of the issues at stake, I would 
like to think of this paper as a small tribute to him. 
4. Gellner tells a delightful and cautionary tale.  Apparently, at a certain Oxford seminar, 
philosophers were engaged in furious argument about the effects of Azande cattle herding 
on their perceptions and rationality, while a post-graduate anthropologist was vainly 
trying to attract the attention of the chair.  Eventually he was permitted to speak and 
pointed out that the Azande do not herd cattle at all.  This seems to have taken the wind 
out of the discussion. 
5. The permutations are endless.  As reason works through language and signs, Todorov for 
example has argued for continuity between adherents of a ‘classical’ theory of semiotics, 
charted from Aristotle to the Stoics, Thomas Aquinas and Augustine.  He distinguishes a 
contrary view expounded most notably by the German Romantics and represented 
contemporarily by hermeneutics, which stresses the degree to which reason is culturally 
and historically situated and so inextricable from language (1977). 
6. However ‘to define nature as the essence of natural things leaves the term ‘natural things’ 
undefined’ (Collingwood 1945: 81. 
7. How pervasive this may be is shown by Inden in his analysis of Western constructions of 
India (1986). 
8. A quite different, and far more interesting, defence of logic has been made by Quine, who 
is also a stern critic of hidden assumptions about essences in Western philosophical 
thinking.  Far from skirting questions of translation or attempting to justify reason a 
priori, as a pragmatist Quine argues that, for scientific purposes, the cost of relinquishing 
logic is very high.  So, where there is uncertainty, it is preferable to cast doubt on the 
transparency of language and the ability of facts to determine theory than to let go of 
logic. 
9. The argument is fully developed in Inden’s forthcoming monograph Imagining ancient 
India, where he also notes the tenacity of these ill-founded ideas down to the present 
generation of writers.  Cannibalism, of ideas at least, is more in evidence in universities 
than it is in the jungles of foetid Western imaginations. 
10. The way that the charge of relativism is formulated by relativists against their detractors 
is so simplistic as to miss the mark entirely. 
Extreme relativism as they discuss it is a stance no anthropologist would seriously hold.  We 
wish to encourage, in Hirst’s words, "points of contact" between cultures, not discourage 
them, or the idea of them.  Our business is, after all, "translation" (Overing 1985a: 3, citing 
Hirst 1985b). 
The problems rationalists have in reading their French counterparts, when they do not ignore 
them, suggests that, as any skilled translator knows, it is not the simple business the 
rationalists pretend. 
11. To say knowledge works dialectically does not mean that any evolutionary or teleological 
principle is implied.  Such principles are, however, presupposed in much rationalist 
argument, see Scholte 1984: 964. 
12. Gellner’s arguments about the dangers of assuming that ‘meaningfulness is an essential 
attribute of social conduct’ (1973a: 56) works equally well against naive forms of 
hermeneutics like Geertz’s (1973). 
13. Winch makes the mistake of treating Collingwood, not as an empiricist, but as an idealist, 
a popular misapprehension to which Hirst gives the background in academic politics, 
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1985a: 43-56.  Collingwood went to pains to stress that history is what people did, 
including how they used their ideas, not essences abstracted from action. 
14. The whole argument is still couched in a language that is far away of from action.  People 
in a society may, on occasion, speak as idealists in some form, as pragmatists and so on.  
A fully empirical approach cannot ignore such kinds of social action. 
15. The exchange was originally published in Archives Européennes de Sociologie in the late 
1960s and was reprinted in Rationality. 
16. An anecdote may help to give some characterization to this litany of arguments.  When I 
once invited Martin Hollis to give a seminar paper (which was defended with typical 
acuity), he advised me, as an anthropologist, to use Quine’s ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ 
– which it happened is exactly what I was doing – to ward off rationalists like himself.  
For such reasons, I find Hollis a particular pleasure to argue with. 
17. cf. ‘Apparent success in translation guarantees identity of the conceptual structure given 
to experience but not of the experience itself.  Identity of content remains, however, a 
necessary condition of correct translation’ (1970b: 230).  (There are unacknowledged 
shades of Wittgenstein here: ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.’(1958: 
223; misquoted by Bloch 1977: 283). 
18. But consider their residual disagreement over the relativity of reason: 
Hollis takes the straight rationalist path, adding that the relativist needs an external 
standpoint in order to declare objectively that one culture has one standard and another 
culture another.  Lukes is partially seduced by the thought that the goodness - the strength 
and relevance - of reasons for belief can depend on culture and context (1982: 11). 
One wonders whether Lukes’s linguistic proficiency has anything to do with his inability to 
adhere to the straight rationalist path. 
19. The problems of this view are neatly summarized by Goodman. 
Knowing is tacitly conceived as a processing of raw material into a finished product; and an 
understanding of knowledge is thus supposed to require that we discover just what the raw 
material is... (But) there is no such thing as the structure of the world for anything to 
conform or fail to conform to (Goodman 1972: 26, 31). 
Philosophers sometimes mistake features of discourse for features of the subject of 
discourse... Coherence is a characteristic of descriptions, not of the world: the significant 
question is not whether the world is coherent, but whether our account of it is (1972: 24). 
Even in science, it is not so easy to ignore the role of discourse.  In short we are back with 
a vengeance to the view of the neutral observer - what Foucault castigated as ‘the 
knowing subject’ - accurately recording the world in a neutral medium of ideas.  
Experience of the world (or the world in itself) is conceived as the raw material, Mind the 
processing machine and concepts the finished product. 
20. ‘Other cultures are, epistemologically, merely a case of other minds’ (Hollis 1982: 83).  
While I agree with Hollis that a radical separation of other minds and other cultures is 
inappropriate (on the grounds that it presumes an exclusive classification and ignores 
intra-cultural diversity), I am worried by quite what is smuggled in under that least 
innocuous of labels ‘epistemologically’, see Salmond 1982, 1985. 
21. If there were propositions, they would induce a certain relation of synonymy or equivalence 
between sentences themselves: those sentences would be equivalent that expressed the same 
proposition.  Now my objection is going to be that the appropriate equivalence relation 
makes no objective sense at the level of sentences (Quine 1970: 3). 
22. His position shares much with the views of other anthropologists of similar intellectual 
ilk, like Sperber 1975; Bloch 1977. 
Beyond Reason 23 
23. But consider the degree to which he falls foul of the charge which his fellow empirical 
rationalist, Gellner, levelled earlier against Winch: 
Winch’s attitude is aptly summarized by his slogan: "Logical relations between propositions 
depend on social relations between men".  And I think we might summarize Strawson’s 
attitude, without too much injustice, by putting into his mouth the opposing slogan; ‘Social 
relations between men depend on logical relations between propositions"(1979: 198). 
Perhaps the reader will begin to concede that my comparison with farce is not entirely 
far-fetched. 
24. The kind of argument put forward by Gellner or Newton-Smith is, on my reading, quite 
different.  To the extent that they are pointing out the successes of the vast Western 
academic and industrial machine, there are few non-rationalists who would disagree.  
Being predominantly geared to a naturalist or materialist view of the world however 
(Baudrillard 1973), such successes are often achieved by ignoring their human and social 
consequences.  As Foucault’s later work makes clear, the result has been a technology of 
powers leading inexorably towards a totalitarianism where the more subjects of the State 
are battered with the verbiage of ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and so forth, the more it becomes a 
simulacrum (Baudrillard 1972, 1983). 
25. Again ironically, the absolutism is proposed by the clerks of an Imperial Formation that 
has long been moribund.  The expression ‘Imperial Formation’ is taken from Inden’s 
forthcoming work Imagining ancient India.  His argument is that the great Imperial 
Formations of colonialism have been replaced by the axis between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  Concern with epistemologizing power seems often to come after it has 
waned. 
26. See for instance the discussion in Comparative anthropology edited by L. Holy, and in 
Semantic anthropology edited by D. Parkin.  In many ways the discussion in Reason and 
morality is a continuation of the debate started in the latter. 
27. A subtler version of rationalism which does not dismiss figurative language out of hand is 
to be found in French structuralism.  On close inspection however, Lévi-Strauss’s method 
consists in reducing the play of tropes to ‘structure’, which is synonymous with the 
wiring of the human brain, and so is a naturalism by deferment.  In the last resort, as he 
admits, Lévi-Strauss manages to combine this with being a Kantian without the 
transcendental.  Dichotomy inevitably rears its head again.  The richness of the myriad 
figures of speech has to be reduced to only two tropes, metaphor and metonymy, without 
which human ways of understanding the world would be too complicated for the binary 
operation of mind which the model requires. 
28. By an unwarranted synecdoche, all figurative language tends to be subsumed under 
‘metaphor’ by philosophers, so conveniently homogenizing language and its uses once 
again. 
29. The inclusion by rationalists of the work of people like Sperber and Bloch is in fact part 
of a broader exclusion.  The ploy of the ‘token foreigner’ gives the impression of a 
breadth and openness of discussion which obviously depends on the intellectual range and 
ability of the domesticated Others who are invited to participate.  As, in this case, the 
guests show little sign of originality, the gesture is pretty empty. 
30. ‘Before me nothing was created but eternal things and I endure eternally.’  These are the 
seventh and eighth lines inscribed over the portals of hell in Canto III of Dante’s Inferno.  
Not only are the lines peculiarly apt, but they are, of course, part of a famous inscription 
of equal relevance.  Now if one cuts through the cloud of verbiage ‘semi-propositional 
representations’, ‘material-object language’, ‘bridgeheads’ etc., one discovers that 
Beyond Reason 24 
rationalism is so naive about discourse and simple semantic context that the reference 
would, on their professional reading, be completely opaque and meaningless.  It would be 
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